The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 survived three wars and decades of hostility. In April 2025, following in the Pahalgam attack, India placed the treaty “in abeyance”, suspended data sharing and allegedly linked restoration to Pakistan’s action on cross border terrorism. Initially Pakistan went to Permanent Court of Arbitration at Hague than into more forums rather than fewer. In January 2026 Pakistan raised this issue in UN Security Council where Pakistani ambassador argued that India’s act is a serious violation of international law. In late April Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar had informed directly to the Security Council’s president. Pakistan declared any unilateral diversion of western river waters an act of war. The brief military conflict that followed ended but the important water dispute did not. In a region which is already stressed by climate change and population growth the Indus has become the most dangerous non-military flashpoint between the two nuclear states.
Under the treaty Pakistan exclusive rights to the western rivers (Indus, Jehlum, Chenab) that supply the bulk of its irrigation, while India controlled the eastern rivers such as (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej). Roughly eighty percent of the system’s water historically flowed to Pakistan.
Agriculture that employs 40 percent of Pakistan’s workforce and contributes about a quarter of GDP depends on it. Hydropower also draws significantly from these rivers. Per capita water availability in Pakistan has already fallen from around 5000 cubic meters in 1951 to below 1,000 cubic meters the threshold of absolute scarcity.
Climate change is rewriting the hydrological assumptions of 1960. Himalayan glaciers that feed the Indus are retreating some studies project major volume losses by the end of century. Monsoon patterns are more erratic, producing both extreme floods and prolonged dry spells. Ground water is being depleted rapidly. The treaty contains no explicit mechanisms for climate driven variability glacial melt or groundwater. India’s earlier notices seeking frustration with a framework designed for a different era.
Suspension of data sharing immediately raised operational risks. Flood forecasting reservoir management and irrigation planning in Pakistan rely on upstream information. During the volatile last year 2025 monsoon the absence of the regular data increased uncertainty precisely when it was most needed. Although physical diversion of western rivers on a large scale has not yet occurred the political signaling statements about not allowing a single drop and treating water as leverage has securitized the resource.
For Pakistan the stakes are existential. Urban supplies in cities such as Lahore and Karachi food production for population exceeding 240 million and energy security are all tied to predictable flows. Domestic mismanagement compounds the problem, under investment in storage inefficient irrigation and weak water governance. Budget allocation for water projects have faced cuts even as scarcity deepens. Blaming only the upstream neighbor is politically convenient but incomplete. Pakistan have to bring major structural changes in this regard.
India faces its own pressures, rising demand groundwater stress, and desire to maximize utilization of its share under a warming climate. Yet using a decades old cooperative treaty as bilateral pressure tool risks converting a technical regime into a permanent source of crisis. In a nuclearized relationship already prone to rapid escalation water disputes introduce a slow burn threat that can flare during drought or flood year.
Re-engagement is possible and it is necessary. Updating the treaty to incorporate climate science, joint monitoring and adaptive management would serve both states. Third party technical facilitation previously provided by the World Bank could help more. Confident building measures on data exchange and early warning would reduce immediate risks even while political conditions for full restoration remain difficult. Unilateralism by contrast invites miscalculation.
South Asia’s next major crisis may not begin with artillery or aircraft. It may begin with the quiet decision to withhold divert or simply stop sharing information about water that millions need to live. The Indus has long been a rare example of functional cooperation and it must continue. Allowing it to become another arena of zero-some rivalry would be strategic failure of the highest order. Water security is national security. Treating it as such with seriousness and restraint is the only responsible course.
About the author: Muhammad Nauman is a strategic studies graduate from NDU Islamabad.