For nearly two months, the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has sustained a sustained campaign of protest against the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) government and its political establishment. Anchored in a comprehensive charter of demands, commonly cited as encompassing 36 to 38 points, the movement’s principal political objective centres on the abolition of the twelve reserved seats in the AJK Legislative Assembly allocated to Kashmiri refugees (migrants) settled outside the territory since 1947. The agitation commenced in early June 2026, with sit-ins concentrated in Rawalakot and repeated announcements of a long march toward Muzaffarabad.
Despite intermittent efforts at dialogue, negotiations have repeatedly stalled. The central obstacle remains the status of the twelve reserved seats. The AJK Supreme Court has affirmed their constitutional protection under the 1974 Interim Constitution, requiring formal amendment for any alteration, while JAAC maintains that these seats distort local representation by allowing non-resident influence over the territory’s legislative and developmental priorities. Concurrently, the region has proceeded with phased elections to the Legislative Assembly. Political actors, preoccupied with securing another five-year mandate, have largely subordinated the resolution of the underlying grievances to electoral calculations. The result has been a protracted standoff in which the interests of ordinary citizens appear secondary.
The cumulative effects of prolonged shutter-down calls, administrative restrictions, and intermittent disruptions have produced severe socio-economic dislocation. Internet services have been severely curtailed, banking operations disrupted, and public transport largely immobilised, generating a climate of uncertainty and constrained mobility across the territory. Ordinary residents, labourers, small traders, and service providers—find themselves caught between the competing pressures of the protest movement and state responses.
Field conversations with local shopkeepers illustrate the depth of the hardship. Aslam Sardar, a cosmetics retailer; Javed Khan, a shoe seller; Iqbal Amir, a garments trader; Asif Nazeer, a sanitary-ware merchant; and Yameen Syed, a vegetable vendor, each reported an inability to meet commercial rent obligations after two months of intermittent closures. Landlords continue to demand payment, while footfall has collapsed. These traders describe themselves as squeezed from both sides: subject to shutdown directives from JAAC and occasional administrative measures, yet without customers or reliable cash flow to sustain their households.
Daily-wage labourers face parallel distress. Construction activity has largely halted, leaving those dependent on irregular employment without income. A naan-maker interviewed during the same inquiries expressed a simple plea for swift resolution, citing escalating prices of essential commodities that now strain already precarious household budgets. Another individual engaged in domestic work reported that his foreign employer had suspended wage payments pending restoration of internet connectivity required for financial transfers, limiting employment to the exhaustion of previously procured materials.
These accounts are not isolated anecdotes; they reflect a broader pattern of economic attrition that falls disproportionately on the most vulnerable segments of society. Neither the JAAC nor the AJK administration has, according to those interviewed, provided targeted financial relief or interim support packages to offset the costs of prolonged disruption. The absence of such measures risks converting legitimate political grievances into a deeper reservoir of public frustration, one that could generate adverse consequences for both the state and the protest movement itself.
The present impasse underscores a familiar tension in contested territories: the difficulty of reconciling structural demands for political reform with the immediate welfare of the population that must bear the costs of confrontation. Sustainable resolution requires recognition that neither electoral competition nor maximalist protest tactics can indefinitely ignore the material conditions of ordinary citizens.
Recommendations
1. Immediate restoration of essential services and humanitarian facilitation. Both the AJK government and JAAC should prioritise the phased resumption of internet connectivity, banking operations, and public transport, alongside the establishment of joint monitoring mechanisms to ensure that essential goods and medical services remain accessible during any continued agitation.
2. Time-bound, structured dialogue with third-party facilitation. Negotiations should resume under a clearly defined timeline, preferably with neutral facilitation (drawing on respected civil society, bar associations, or senior interlocutors with prior experience in AJK disputes), focusing first on confidence-building measures and a sequenced approach to the twelve seats question rather than an all-or-nothing confrontation.
3. Interim economic relief for affected livelihoods. The AJK government, potentially with federal support, should announce a targeted relief package rent deferrals or subsidies for small traders, cash assistance or food support for daily-wage labourers, and temporary wage guarantees for disrupted service workers, while JAAC should calibrate shutter-down calls to minimise irreversible damage to the informal economy.
4. Constitutional and representational pathway for the reserved seats. Rather than unilateral abolition or rigid defence of the status quo, both sides should commit to a transparent process examining options under the Interim Constitution, ranging from residency-linked reforms, weighted representation, or a formal amendment procedure accompanied by independent analysis of the seats’ impact on local accountability and resource allocation.
5. Depoliticisation of immediate welfare and restraint during the electoral cycle. Political parties and JAAC leadership should issue public commitments to refrain from exploiting the crisis for electoral advantage, while security and administrative responses should prioritise de-escalation, the release of non-violent detainees where feasible, and the avoidance of measures that further isolate the civilian population.
The people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir deserve governance that addresses both structural inequities and the daily material realities of survival. Prolonged confrontation without regard for the latter risks eroding the very legitimacy that both the state and popular movements claim to defend.
About the author: Akseer Ali Saif is an IR graduate from NDU Islamabad, International Affairs Analyst, specializing in South Asian geopolitics and security strategy. He is the founder of the “Azad Kashmir Humanitarian Forum” independent think tank based in Kotli AJK. He writes on regional power dynamics, civil-military relations, and the strategic narratives shaping India-Pakistan relations. He has work experience with TPF, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) & Army Institute of Military History (AIMH).